I expected my book to be published by now. I'm finding it difficult to keep new errors from creeping into the manuscript during the edit and design phase. Today, 1 Feb 11, I submitted what I hope is my last set of corrections. I may see the final proof by the end of this week. If so, the first printing may be completed by the end of February.
A number of friends all over the country, and a few in Europe, have requested signed copies as soon they are available. I intend to accomodate them and anyone else who is interested. If I seem a bit obnoxious or at least redundant, when I notify everone, through Face Book, Twitter, this blog, emails, and every other method I can, of the book's availability, please bear with me.
I'm will probably give this blog a rest until I see the first book.
Mongoose
Tuesday, February 1, 2011
Saturday, January 15, 2011
Criticism in Perspective
One more thing potential readers of Damian and Mongoose should know even before they read the book: I never say in the book that investigative techniques practiced or promoted by others in the opoeration are wrong, only that they were not appropriate for this particular operation. I always understood why the target suspect was totally underestimated by my superiors.
In the history of U.S. Army counterintelligence, a suspect like Clyde Conrad had never been seen. I was critical of my superiors' lack of imagination, but only as it applied to Clyde. While I remained open to the possibility that Clyde could be "jacking us around," I never believed he was.
To this day I suspect there is even more to Clyde's espionage activities than he revealed to me. The FBI stated to me that the only reason they stopped searching for more of his associates was that too much time had passed and not enough evidence was available to guarantee a conviction.
Mongoose
In the history of U.S. Army counterintelligence, a suspect like Clyde Conrad had never been seen. I was critical of my superiors' lack of imagination, but only as it applied to Clyde. While I remained open to the possibility that Clyde could be "jacking us around," I never believed he was.
To this day I suspect there is even more to Clyde's espionage activities than he revealed to me. The FBI stated to me that the only reason they stopped searching for more of his associates was that too much time had passed and not enough evidence was available to guarantee a conviction.
Mongoose
Tuesday, January 4, 2011
Introduction
I have written a book titled, Damian and Mongoose. I'm self-publishing through Wheatmark of Tucson, AZ. The book should be available by the end of January 2011 for print on demand.
The book is an accurate account of an undercover, counterespionage operation in which I participated in 1987 while serving as Operation Noncommissioned Officer in charge (NCOIC) and First Sergeant (1SG) of B Company, 527th Militry Intelligence (MI) Battalion (Bn), in Stuttgart, Germany. The fifteen month
operation begins in Bad Kreuznach (BK), and ends in Stuttgart.
The operation was controlled by U.S. Army Counterintelligence (USAI). No one was aware of my involvement in the undercover Operation except the special USAI team, my Bn Commander in Kaislautern (K Town) and one other Bn Officer, and my Brigade (Bde) Commander and one other Bde Officer.
While the account of activities, conversations, and my thoughts are vertually duplicated in my book and approved for publication by the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, and USAI, opinions expressed are all mine. They are based on my twenty years of training, both as an infantry soldier for five years and a Counterintelligence agent for fifteen years.
I believe the U.S. Army approved the book as written because they saw a benefit in revealing their ability to infiltrate even the most sophisticated foreign espionage activity directed against the Army and against NATO.
I've started this blog for the readers of my book. During discussions of the operation, numerous questions have arisen. I tried to answer those in my book as well as others I anticipated . I am willing to expand the answers to those questions and more for anyone who reads my book.
Two areas of expertise in which I held strong opinions, seldom shared or understood by others in my profession, are counterespionage operations and operational security. They are inextricably connected. I believe many readers will not only understand the techniques I employed in the operation, but will recognize their absolute necessity.
Of course I welcome comments to that effect, but I will also entertain disagreement and even criticism. I don't expect much activity on my blog until my book has been read, and I don't intend to elaborate on the techniques which are clearly controversial in my book until it becomes available.
I could list my various assignments in which I received training in the areas I want to eventually discuss, but I prefer at this time to define some terms which I hope I and my readers are likely to use.
"Experience" is one term I consider most often misunderstood. Time spent in an activity is not beneficial experience, only lessons learned. Doing something wrong for several years, with a little good luck thrown in, is not beneficial experience unless one recognizes the mistakes and learns from them.
"Instinct" is another term seldom given weight. Good instinct in counterespionage operations or counterintelligence investigation is quite often derived from experience in totally unrelated activities. Dealing with people in all walks of life teaches one to anticipate people's reactions and to read their unspoken language, if one is paying attention. Recognizing those who have paid attention is giving weight to "instinct" when choosing a counterespionage operative or trusting his judgement, whether he or she has done it before or not.
I'll try to post the latest status on the publication of my book.
Danny L. Williams, Retired CI SGM and New Author.
The book is an accurate account of an undercover, counterespionage operation in which I participated in 1987 while serving as Operation Noncommissioned Officer in charge (NCOIC) and First Sergeant (1SG) of B Company, 527th Militry Intelligence (MI) Battalion (Bn), in Stuttgart, Germany. The fifteen month
operation begins in Bad Kreuznach (BK), and ends in Stuttgart.
The operation was controlled by U.S. Army Counterintelligence (USAI). No one was aware of my involvement in the undercover Operation except the special USAI team, my Bn Commander in Kaislautern (K Town) and one other Bn Officer, and my Brigade (Bde) Commander and one other Bde Officer.
While the account of activities, conversations, and my thoughts are vertually duplicated in my book and approved for publication by the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, and USAI, opinions expressed are all mine. They are based on my twenty years of training, both as an infantry soldier for five years and a Counterintelligence agent for fifteen years.
I believe the U.S. Army approved the book as written because they saw a benefit in revealing their ability to infiltrate even the most sophisticated foreign espionage activity directed against the Army and against NATO.
I've started this blog for the readers of my book. During discussions of the operation, numerous questions have arisen. I tried to answer those in my book as well as others I anticipated . I am willing to expand the answers to those questions and more for anyone who reads my book.
Two areas of expertise in which I held strong opinions, seldom shared or understood by others in my profession, are counterespionage operations and operational security. They are inextricably connected. I believe many readers will not only understand the techniques I employed in the operation, but will recognize their absolute necessity.
Of course I welcome comments to that effect, but I will also entertain disagreement and even criticism. I don't expect much activity on my blog until my book has been read, and I don't intend to elaborate on the techniques which are clearly controversial in my book until it becomes available.
I could list my various assignments in which I received training in the areas I want to eventually discuss, but I prefer at this time to define some terms which I hope I and my readers are likely to use.
"Experience" is one term I consider most often misunderstood. Time spent in an activity is not beneficial experience, only lessons learned. Doing something wrong for several years, with a little good luck thrown in, is not beneficial experience unless one recognizes the mistakes and learns from them.
"Instinct" is another term seldom given weight. Good instinct in counterespionage operations or counterintelligence investigation is quite often derived from experience in totally unrelated activities. Dealing with people in all walks of life teaches one to anticipate people's reactions and to read their unspoken language, if one is paying attention. Recognizing those who have paid attention is giving weight to "instinct" when choosing a counterespionage operative or trusting his judgement, whether he or she has done it before or not.
I'll try to post the latest status on the publication of my book.
Danny L. Williams, Retired CI SGM and New Author.
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